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1I Introduction
How to deal with the perpetrators of massive and systematic human rights violations
after the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule? This question was
considered one of the hottest issues on the political agendas of the newly elected
democratic executives who came to power in Latin American countries in the 1980s.1
Most executives carefully pushed the issue to the side, hoping that it would cool off
over time. Indeed it did - at least in most cases. Out of the fifteen countries that
underwent transition to democracy in this region, only Argentina took on the
challenge of putting a careful selection of its military top brass on trial and imposing
jail sentences upon them. The un-doing of the trials by the second democratically
elected president, Carlos Saul Menem, who pardoned those convicted when he took
power in 1989, is a well-known story. Less well-known, perhaps, is it that the courts
in Argentina are now – ten years later – trying to corner some of the same generals for
the kidnapping of hundreds of children during the rule of the juntas. Moreover, the
Argentine federal courts are trying to force the military to provide information about
the final destiny of the thousands of people who disappeared during the same period.
Similar events are taking place in Chile, where the Supreme Court’s stripping of
Pinochet’s senatorial immunity has mocked the institutional legacies of his
authoritarian government, which were expected to safeguard the military against any
future prosecution. The question that begs an answer, then, is why has the issue of
human rights violations reappeared? And why only in some countries, while in other
countries, such as Guatemala or El Salvador, whose human rights violations were
equal to or worse than those of Argentina and Chile, successful prosecutions have not
taken place?
Scholars of democratic transitions have argued that human rights policies at
the time of transition were products of elite negotiations, where the relative strength
of the military largely determined what policies the executive could reasonably opt
for.2 A newer group of scholars have improved on this static view of institutions by
arguing that the shifting balance in civil-military relationships after transition must be
taken into account when analysing human rights policies.3 However, because these
scholars continue to place their main focus on executive decision making, they do not
sufficiently acknowledge the impact of a third political player that has gradually
become more influential in policy making: the judiciary.
In this paper I intend to fill this gap. By arguing that certain constitutional
reforms in a series of Latin American countries since the beginning of the 1990s have
enabled the judiciary to take on an increasingly assertive role, I challenge the
conventional wisdom that the executive is the sole policy maker in the field of human
rights. At the end of 1999, 15 out of 19 Latin American countries had carried out
judicial reforms, ranging from minor changes to virtually complete overhauls.4 Some
of these reforms have formally increased the independence of the judiciary vis-à-vis
the executive.5
                                                  
1 See for example. Huntington 1991; Mainwaring, O’Donnell and Valenzuela 1992;
Malamud-Goti 1990; McAdams 1997; Pion-Berlin 1994; Zalaquett 1992.
2 See for example Karl and Schmitter 1991.
3 See for example Hunter 1997, 1998; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 1998.
4 See for example Buscalgia, Dakolias and Ratcliff 1995; Dakolias 1995; Frühling 1998;
Garro 1993; Pilar 1999.
5 The reforms have mainly been undertaken in order to make the judicial systems more
transparent and efficient, so as to better implement the rule of law. Some of the reforms have
required constitutional changes, whereas others have not.
2The initial failure to hold trials at the time of transition was principally
because the judiciaries in most Latin American countries were weak and often
partisan, favouring whoever was in power, including the military. This meant that the
efforts of private civilians to seek justice in the region rarely succeeded at the time of
transition. I argue that two factors have encouraged judges to take on a more activist
approach in human rights matters: (1) certain constitutional reforms that have affected
the composition and working of the courts and (2) a perceived reduction in military
threat. These changes, I argue, have enabled judges to re-interpret existing amnesty
laws (designed to protect the military) and accept cases of serious human rights
violations that they would have rejected earlier. I also propose that a persistent
demand for justice is a pre-condition that must be met in order for reversals in human
rights policies to take place years after the transition to democratic rule, because
judges can only rule on cases that are brought before them.
In the next section I outline the main literature on human rights issues in
transition to democracy. I next detail my argument that variations in judicial
independence are crucial to understanding changes in policy outcomes over time. To
examine this argument in more detail, I carry out an in-depth analysis of Chile and
Argentina in part four. Finally, I give some suggestions as to where future research
may be directed. The propositions tested on Chile and Argentina in this paper should
be of more general interest since many newly established democracies in various
regions of the world are in the process of strengthening their institutions and
democratic practices, and are also grappling with the legacies of their authoritarian
pasts.
II Why do human rights policies change over time? Competing views
Under what circumstances is it possible to put on trial military officers who
committed serious human rights during military rule?6 There are, in essence, three
main bodies of literature concerned with the issue of human rights violations in
democratic transition. All share a legitimate concern with civil-military relations – for
political or moral-philosophical reasons.
First, the literature inspired by the Latin American transitions in the early
1980s argued that elite negotiations determined the power balance between the
military and the new democratic government. The institutional legacies of the
transition were believed to set the scope for executive action in the field of human
rights.7 A specific claim of this so-called mode-of-transition literature was that trials
of alleged human rights perpetrators would not take place unless there had been a total
regime collapse or the military had been defeated in a war.8 This body of theory
correctly explained that where the military remained a threat to the new regime, the
democratic government would be cautious in its choice of human rights policy. At
best, it would set up a truth commission, but more often than not, do nothing at all.9
                                                  
6 I exclude from this analysis other human rights policies implemented to deal with abuses of
past authoritarian regimes, such as truth commissions, reparation measures, and memorial
projects. See Walsh 1996 for a good account of different policy options.
7 There is an extensive literature on democratic transition and consolidation. For Latin
America, see Diamond and Plattner 1993; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986;
Huntington 1991; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Mainwaring, O’Donnell, and Valenzuela 1992.
For an excellent account of the military’s role, see Stepan 1989.
8 See, for example, Huntington 1991, Sutil 1997, and Zalaquett 1992.
9 See Skaar 1999 for an analysis of 30 countries worldwide undergoing transition and dealing
with legacies of gross human rights violations.
3However, because many of these scholars assumed that the balance of power between
prominent political actors (specifically the military and the incoming government)
was static, they failed to account for the reversals in human rights policies that we
have been observing over the last few years.
In response to this obvious weakness of democratic transition theory, a small
group of scholars have become increasingly concerned with how civil-military
relations may change over time and how new institutional arrangements may alter the
behaviour of key political players who influence policy outcomes.10 These scholars
provide insights that greatly improve the transition literature. Yet also they,
principally because they overstate the executive’s powers to determine policy
outcomes, fail to predict the extensive changes in human rights policies that are
currently unfolding. It is this literature that I wish to expand on in my analysis.
A third body of literature on the topic, commonly referred to as ‘transitional
justice’ stresses new democratic governments’ duty to their citizens to deal with past
brutalities by uncovering the truth about the abuses and prosecute the guilty.11 It deals
mainly with the policy options available to democratic governments in the context of
transition from authoritarian rule. This literature emphasises both the importance of
military subordination to civilian rule and the role of civil society in demanding
justice in the form of trials. However, because it is predominantly normative in
character, it does not offer systematic analytical explanations for different policy
choices and outcomes.
Finally, scholars of international law have pointed to the remarkable changes
in human rights law and the increased international concern with human rights abuses
in the past decade. The globalisation in communications, they argue, has made it
increasingly difficult for governments to commit human rights abuses with
impunity.12 These scholars also point to the importance of the injection of new ideas
into national legal cultures, which in turn affect national decision making in the field
of human rights. However, they fail to specify exactly the kind of mechanisms that
have to be in place for this to happen.
Few scholars have paid much attention to the judiciary’s potential role in
shaping human rights policies, or determining the outcome of particular cases. Part of
the reason is probably that judiciaries of many developing countries (particularly in
Latin America) were known to be subservient to executive will and therefore did not
function independently at the time of transition. With the recent widespread judicial
reforms, though, we can no longer assume that the judiciary is merely a passive actor
who is directed by the executive. If the judicial reforms have in fact been
implemented, we might expect judges who now feel secure in their offices and wish
to implement the rule of law to take on cases of human rights violations that are
brought to them. Building on the embryonic literature on the role of courts in
transitions to democracy13 and the new literature on dynamic civil-military
                                                  
10 For excellent treatment of these points, see Hunter 1998 and Pion-Berlin and Argeneaux
1998.
11 See for example McAdams 1997, Walsh 1996, Panizza 1995, Pion-Berlin 1994, Kritz 1995,
Malamud-Goti 1990.
12 The establishment of international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda in
1994 and the conclusion in 1998 of the Treaty of Rome setting up an International Criminal
Court, 50 years after such an institution was first proposed, are commonly cited as evidence to
support this view.
13 See for example Hammergren 1998, Schedler et.al. 1999.
4relationships14, I will show how the changing role of the judiciary is key to
understanding recent unexpected changes in human rights policies, here narrowly
defined as trials of (ex) military personnel. By ‘trials’ I here mean prosecution against
military personnel.
 
III Judicial independence and trials of human rights violators
A. When may we expect trials?
In this section, I develop an analytical framework for understanding the dynamics of
policy making in the human rights field by building and expanding on an argument
launched by Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux. In their well-placed criticism of the static
view of institutions in transition literature, they argue that policy outcomes are
inextricably tied to levels of institutional concentration and autonomy in the executive
branch.15 Specifically, they argue that policy making, particularly in the human rights
sphere, could be seen as an elite bargaining situation where the outcome depends on
(i) the authority of the decision makers (i.e. their power over the outcome) and (ii)
their authority (absence of influence from other actors). The core of their argument is
that the fewer veto players (i.e. the fewer actors who have to be consulted), the easier
it is to get policy outcomes in congruence with stated policy preference of the
executive.16 They do mention that where the judiciary has an independent function
(and thus constitutes an additional veto player to the executive-legislature-military
structure), the possibility of reaching consensus on human rights issues is reduced.
I suggest a different perspective. Rather than view an independent judiciary as
a possible obstacle for the executive to push his policy preference through because the
number of veto players is increased, I argue instead that an independent judiciary may
replace the executive as the veto player in human rights policy making. I propose the
following main working hypothesis: Reversals in human rights polices after
transitions to democracy are more likely to take place in countries and during periods
where the judiciary is more independent . If my hypothesis is correct, we should
expect to see more prosecutions of and verdicts against human rights perpetrators in
countries and in periods where there is more judicial independence. If not true,
countries that have not reformed their judiciaries should be as likely to hold trials as
those countries that have, given that these reforms are actually implemented. We
would also expect to see new interpretations of existing amnesty laws in countries and
in years where there is more judicial independence. These reinterpretations should
extend the scope of cases on which the judiciary can rule.
The main rival hypothesis coming out of the transition literature, as well as its
critiques, is that the executive branch alone is responsible for policy making in human
rights matters. Political leaders in democratic systems are expected to respond to
pressures and challenges to their survival from various societal forces. The pressures
and challenges relevant to human rights are (1) military pressure for immunity and
against prosecution; (2) domestic pressure for ‘justice’ (from the human rights sector,
other specific interest organizations, and possibly also part of the public); and (3)
international pressure to respect human rights and comply with good governance
procedures. Democratic transition literature thus attributed the absence of trials to the
failure of executives to prosecute military officers immediately the transition because
they perceived military demand for impunity to be stronger than public demand for
                                                  
14 See Hunter 1997, 1998; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 1998.
15 See Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux (1998: 633).
16 For a basic explanation of the veto players’ argument, see Tsebelis 1990.
5justice. Strong militaries could put force behind their words by staging a coup if they
felt sufficiently threatened. Critiques of transition theory have correctly argued that
shifts in civil-military relations have made policy changes in the human rights field
possible, assuming that the policy outcome still depends on the executive.
In this paper I argue a different point, namely that policy outcomes on human
rights issues are decided by executive preference only where the judiciary is
dependent. Where the judiciary is free to act more independently, executive
preference should not matter for the policy outcome. Table 1 sums up the logic of this
argument.
Table 1: Executive policy position and judicial independence
Judiciary
More dependent More independent
Pro-human rights Trials TrialsExecutive policy
position Anti-human rights No trials Trials
Note that in the case of a pro-human rights executive and an independent judiciary, it
would be hard to attribute the policy outcome of trials to the influence of one over the
other. We could unveil the causal relationship through an in-depth study of the
particular trial(s) in question. This is a problem I will discuss in more detail in the
empirical section of this paper.
B. When is the judiciary more independent?
The main argument made above is that trials of human rights perpetrators are more
likely to take place where there is more judicial independence. When is the judiciary
more independent? This is a conceptual as well as a methodological challenge, on
which legal scholars disagree wildly. Judicial independence is necessarily a
continuous rather than a dichotomous variable. In the narrowest sense, judicial
independence means judges’ freedom from political influence.17 In a broader sense,
most scholars seem to agree that there are three types of independence: (1) from
executive influence or the other government branches (so-called structural
independence), (2) from pressure groups, such as political parties, and (3) from other
judges.18 The first type refers to the collective independence of the judicial branch as
an entity, and the second and third types to the individual independence of the judges.
Because I am concerned with the executive-judicial relationship in this paper,
I shall give extra attention to structural independence. However, since very few – if
any – judicial systems operate in a political vacuum, I shall also comment on other
kinds of independence and how we may go about measuring them. One way of
ensuring structural independence is through constitutional guarantees. For the
                                                  
17 See Domingo (1999: 153). Dakolias (1995: 7) calls this ‘structural independence’ and Fiss
(1993) calls this ‘political insularity’. Structural independence constitutionally defines the
relationship between the three government branches and the relative autonomy of the judicial
branch.
18 See for example Dakolias (1995: 172-76), Fiss (1993: 55-56), Becker (1970), Domingo
(1999: 153-55), Rosenn (1987), Larkins (1996).
6purpose of this paper, I have singled out four factors typically mentioned in the
literature as key indicators of structural independence:19
(i) appointment procedures: judges in general, and Supreme Court
justices in particular, should not be hired and fired at the whim of the
executive;
(ii) length of tenure for Supreme Court justices: The court composition
should carry over from administration to administration with only
minor adjustments. Life tenure is normally considered ideal because
justices are less prone to political influence if they have secure
tenure;20
(iii) judicial councils, which are generally, though not always, composed of
representatives from several public and private institutions. Their main
purpose is to select Supreme Court justices, though some also make
recommendations for appellate court and lower court judges. By
removing from the executive the power to appoint justices, the
councils help ensure less partisan courts,21 and
(iv) measures to increase the judicial review powers of the supreme court,
through the creation of constitutional courts or by other means.22
However, as several scholars have pointed out, these structural mechanisms in Latin
American constitutions have not guaranteed the courts’ decision-making autonomy or
so-called substantive independence; they merely create a framework for independent
judicial action.23 Courts in Latin America are widely believed to decide high profile
cases in the way the executive wants, often following explicit orders – in spite of
constitutional guarantees from executive interference. Yet, examining an increase in
formal judicial independence might give an important starting point from which to
assess changes in actual judicial independence.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument that constitutional increases in judicial
independence translate into actual independence.24 One could still object that
constitutional reforms affect only the power balance between the executive and the
judiciary. Another heavy-weight political actor in the Latin American context, who, to
the best of my knowledge, has been utterly ignored in the theoretical literature on
judicial independence, is the military. In Latin America, the judiciary, like the
executive, has been vulnerable to military threat. Judges could find themselves out of
a job if there was a military coup (in which case the entire court might be replaced) or
if they took on unpopular court cases that threatened the integrity and reputation of
the military during or after military rule. In an analysis of changing institutional
arrangements and shifting civil-military relations in a post-transitional setting, it may
                                                  
19 See for example Domingo 1999; Hammergren 1998; Larkins 1996; and Widner 1999. Note
that other indicators, such as such as financial independence, could also have been included.
20 However, as Helmke 1999 elegantly argues for the Argentine case, there are situations
where insecure tenure might lead to increased independence if the justices are more eager to
please future politicians than the sitting government.
21 In a few countries (Colombia, Mexico, and Bolivia) the councils also control judicial
budgets and administrative systems See Hammergren (1998: 12-13).
22 Like the councils, the constitutional courts are patterned on earlier European experiences.
Their main purpose is to provide a check on executive and legislative abuses. For brief
histories of the function of judicial review, see Schwartz 1999 and Domingo 1999.
23 See for example Dakolias 1996; Domingo 1999; Hammergren 1998; and Vaughn 1993.
24 This can only be determined by empirical analysis.
7therefore be reasonable to assess the presence of the military in politics. We might
therefore expect a reformed judiciary to rule independently only where the military is
considered to be safely in the barracks. We may reformulate this condition into a
testable claim: The absence of credible military threat is necessary for the judiciary to
operate independently.
The failure to prosecute human rights violations immediately after a transition
could therefore be attributed to the existence of credible military threats to destabilise
the new democracy rather than to executive dominance over the courts per sé. Threats
may now have subsided.25 If this were correct, we would expect judges to rule more
independently, and hence expect the likelihood of trials against old or retired military
personnel to increase, as the influence of the military in politics decreased. Though
many Latin American judiciaries in the past were known to be conservative and
supportive of military rule, it may be safe to assume that most judges in most
countries now support democracy. If we further assume that preserving democracy is
an overriding concern for the judiciary, then judges would be susceptible to military
influence if they think that the decisions made by the courts may provoke a coup.
I propose to formally measure ‘reduced credible military threat’ or military
safety by counting the number of years since the year of transition, or the last
attempted military intervention, until present.26 The underlying assumption would be
that the propensity for the military to intervene in politics by force decreases as the
length of uninterrupted democratic rule increases. In a more detailed empirical
analysis we could also look for special situations (like the arrest of Pinochet or
charging military officers with abuse or corruption) in which the military might have
been expected to cause trouble, but did not. The absence of military action could be
interpreted as ‘signalling’ non-threat.
Thirdly, one could argue that judges might also be prone to influence from
other judges. Due to the hierarchical structure of the Latin American justice systems,
it has frequently been argued that higher court judges exert undue influence over their
subordinates in the form of controlling nomination, promotion, and removal
procedures. Hence, we may expect changes in court composition or nomination
procedures affecting the relationship between the various levels in the court systems
to possibly increase the individual independence of judges. One way of formally
measuring this would be examining legal or constitutional changes that remove or
reduce the power of higher court judges over lower court judges.
In addition to the above factors affecting the individual and collective
independence of the judiciary, international pressure has arguably also played a role
in pushing national judiciaries to agree to reopen cases of human rights violations or
                                                  
25 Note that this is the same argument that transition theory used to explain why executives
failed to take action against alleged perpetrators at the time of transition.
26 Reduced military threat may be a factor of time. One may assume that as old military
generals retire and new officers received better training than their predecessors did, the
military should gradually become less willing to interfere in domestic politics. In particular,
those who could potentially been charged with human rights violations are increasingly less
likely to be in power (and hence have a position to defend) as time goes by. Conventional
wisdom has it that the military is (relatively) safely in the barracks in most Latin American
countries, i.e. they are relatively unlikely to attempt coups. Exceptions are Ecuador, as
demonstrated in the unexpected coup on January 29, 2000, perhaps Venezuela, and Chile in
the mid-1990s. Ultimately, all non-partisan judiciaries should want to punish the military as a
way of enforcing the rule of law. There is a large scholarly debate on the desirability of
prosecution, which I choose not to enter here.
8look for loopholes in existing legislation to redefine or reinterpret existing amnesty
laws. The exact mechanisms for how changes in human rights norms and new
international standards of human rights culture may have influenced the ideological
position of justices are hard to get at and can only be determined by careful empirical
analysis. For the section dealing with case selection, I shall therefore treat changing
international norms as an enabling condition, rather than use it to specifically explain
why some countries have done more than others in the field of human rights.
However, in the empirical section I make some suggestions as to how international
factors may have influenced national decision making in specific cases.
Finally, because of the way the justice systems in Latin America operate,
judges can only rule on matters that are brought before them – they cannot initiate
polices on their own account. This gives a second testable claim: A sustained demand
for justice is necessary for an independent judiciary to take on cases of human rights
violations. Assuming this is correct, we would expect judiciaries to take up human
rights cases only when there is a sustained domestic demand for trials from sectors
such as human rights non-governmental organisations, lawyers associations, and the
public. That means that countries with a strong and active civil society should be
more likely to have policy reversals in this field than those countries that do not.27
Pressure from these various sectors could be measured through opinion polls,
newspaper reports on demonstrations, and the number of cases of human rights
violations brought to court.
To sum up, I have developed a theoretical argument for when we expect to see
trials in a post-transitional setting now given a multi-dimensional working definition
of judicial independence. There are at least three necessary, though not sufficient,
conditions for initiating trials against military personnel for gross human rights
violations committed during military rule, if the executive favours an anti-human
rights policy: a judiciary independent from the executive, reduced military threat, and
sustained pressure for justice from the human rights sector and its supporters.
C. Method
Case selection
About half of the fifteen countries in Latin America that have gone through transitions
from authoritarian to democratic rule since the late 1970s had brutal military regimes
that committed serious human rights violations against their own populations. Only
one country – Argentina – successfully put a handful of its generals on trial during the
transition. If my argument holds true, we would expect to see reversals in the initial
policy outcome at the time of transition only in countries that later have strengthened
their judiciaries through constitutional reform, where the military is considered
(relatively) safely back in the barracks, and where there is a reasonably strong human
rights sector demanding justice. As a first-cut approach to examining this argument,
table 4 provides an overview of evidence from Latin America with regard to changes
in formal judicial independence due to constitutional reforms and presence or absence
                                                  
27 This argument raises the question why the judiciary should have to respond to public
pressure at all. Strictly speaking, it should not since justices do not rely on public support for
staying in office (indeed, this is one of the defining features that make the judiciary distinct
from the executive and legislature). However, when the judiciary is not fully (personally and
collectively) independent, public pressure could work on the judges in two ways: (1) directly
through the number of cases presented by individual citizens and (2) indirectly, through the
executive, which is susceptible to public pressure through electoral politics, and which also
wields power over the judiciary.
9of the military in politics. I have included only those countries that have both (i)
undergone transition from authoritarian to democratic rule (this excludes Costa Rica,
Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico) and (ii) have had a past of serious human rights
violations (this excludes the Dominican Republic, and Panama). I have, for the
moment, excluded information about civil society’s demand for justice.
Table 2: Military threat and formal judicial independence
 Formal judicial independence after constitutional
reforms28
Less More
Low
No trials
Nicaragua30
Uruguay
Honduras
Brazil
Trials
Argentina
Bolivia
Chile
No trials
El Salvador
Peru31
Military threat
after transition
to democracy29
High
No trials
Ecuador
No trials
Guatemala
Paraguay
A rough first-cut analysis based primarily on formal measurement suggests trials for
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, and Peru in a post-transition setting. A closer
look at El Salvador and Peru explains why no trials have been held. In El Salvador,
                                                  
28 As a preliminary step I have looked only at constitutional changes that affect the degree of
judicial independence. I rely on my previous own (unpublished) work here. The four criteria
used are appointment procedures, length of tenure for Supreme Court justices, establishment
of judicial councils, and expansion of judicial review powers of the supreme court (consult
section III A for details). If constitutional changes along these four dimensions between the
date of transition for each country and December 1999 have received a score of 0-2, I have
recorded judicial independence as ‘less’. A score of 3-4 is recorded as ‘more’. See Appendix
1 for coding.
29 Placing countries along this dimension has been a judgement call, based on the length of
the survival of democratic regimes and the presence/absence of concrete threats against the
government in the form of coup attempts. I have recorded military threat ‘high’ for the
following countries because the military arguably still plays a prominent role in politics:
Ecuador (where the coup in January 2000 broke 22 years of civilian rule); Guatemala (threats
against human rights initiatives – Bishop Gerardi killed after release of human rights report in
1998); and Paraguay (Stroessner dictatorship overthrown in 1993, but arguably too soon to
tell if the regime is stable or not). By contrast, El Salvador and Chile have had only 8 and 10
years of democratic rule respectively, but scholars agree that the military are safely back in
the barracks and that the probability of military intervention in politics today is very small.
30 The transition referred to is the end of the Somoza regime.
31 Incidentally, human rights violations in Peru have been worse after the return to civilian
rule in 1980 than they were during the military dictatorship (1968-80). The numbers of dead
and disappeared recorded from mid-1985 through 1987 under the government of Alan García
dropped to one-third of the levels for the 1983-84 period under the Belaunde administration.
See Hunter 1997 for details.
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very few of the judicial reforms included in the 1983 Constitution and those passed in
the 1990s have been implemented.32 Moreover, the human rights movement in El
Salvador after the end of civil war and the signed peace agreement in 1992 has been
exceptionally weak and unable to forward strong claims of justice to the judicial
apparatus.33 Similarly, the judicial reforms in Peru carried out under President
Fujimori in the 1990s have been more show cases than true reforms. Judges have been
hired and fired at random and the judicial system is reported to be far from
independent. In sum, it is not surprising that judges in these two countries are still
refusing to take on cases of serious human rights violations.
A crucial point, therefore, is to assess whether constitutional changes have
been implemented and have had any affects – or assess whether other factors may
have played a significant role. For the remaining part of this analysis, I have singled
out Argentina and Chile for a more detailed investigation the political processes that
have led to trials. These two countries constitute an excellent pair for examining the
hypotheses mapped out in the previous section for several reasons. First, because the
two countries went through very different kinds of transitions (by collapse in
Argentina and by ballot in Chile), they started off with very different institutional
arrangements at the time of transition. Yet, over time they have converged in terms of
institutional development. As a result, I argue, they have experienced remarkably
similar policy developments in the human rights field. Second, their shared
characteristics in terms of history, democratic institutions, levels of development, and
geo-political position allow me to keep a number of intervening variables constant
and thus focus on variance in institutions over time.
For an expanded analysis, it might be useful to include Uruguay and Bolivia as
test cases. Bolivia has had the same development as Chile and Argentina in terms of
judicial reform and initiation of prosecution of military personnel, but has a very
different political, institutional and legal context. Uruguay is much more similar to
Chile and Argentina in terms of contextual variables, but has had no reform of its
judicial apparatus. However, due to limitations of space, the remaining part of this
paper will focus on Argentina and Chile.
IV Does judicial independence matter for trials of human rights violators? An
analysis of Argentina and Chile
The key argument I wish to pose here is that certain of the constitutional reforms
enacted in Argentina and Chile have been crucial to the changes in human rights
policy. In this section I set out to show two things: First, that an executive pro-human
rights position is not necessary for trials to take place. Second, that the changes in
degrees of judicial independence over time offer a better explanation for the observed
changes in human rights policies. Using the analytical framework developed in
section III A as a point of departure, I look specifically at (a) whether constitutional
reforms affecting judicial independence have been implemented, (b) alterations in
perceived military ‘threat’, and (c) the activity of the human rights sector, and
evaluate how these changes may have affected prosecution of military perpetrators. I
also offer brief suggestions as to how certain contextual factors, such as development
in international human rights law, may have encouraged judges to take on a more
activist role in human rights cases. For sake of clarity, I trace these changes separately
for the two countries.
                                                  
32 See Popkin 2000 for an excellent analysis of the judicial reform process in El Salvador.
33 Popkin (2000: 161).
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As will become clear, the Argentine judiciary has gone from being fairly
independent, to being overruled by executive preference, to gradually regaining its
independence. In Chile, the change has been much more steady: from virtual judicial
non-independence at the time of the transition to a fairly high degree of independence
today. Because earlier human rights polices have been given detailed treatment in
existing literature on democratic transition and transitional justice, I will only
summarise these before giving details on the less documented recent trials as well as
the judicial reforms affecting the formal independence of the courts.
A. Argentina – from trials to pardon to trials
The Alfonsín government (1982-1989): Transition and trials34
The Argentine military were forced out of power after losing both face and legitimacy
in the failed battle over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands against Britain in 1982. The
new government, headed by President Raúl Alfonsín, took swift action to address
human rights violations committed by the military. Alfonsín, who had made human
rights to one of his high-profile cases in his election campaign, established a truth
commission (CONADEP – National Commission on Disappeared Persons), used a
presidential decree to undo the existing amnesty law self-imposed by the military
before they left power, and ordered prosecution of the former military commanders.
The military was initially in no position to protect itself against prosecution. Although
Alfonsín’s government at first allowed the military courts to try the cases, the military
tribunal declared its inability and unwillingness to complete the proceedings against
the junta leaders. On 4 October 1984, a civilian appellate court therefore assumed
jurisdiction over the prosecutions. The trial resulted in the conviction in 1985 of five
military commanders who had governed Argentina in the period 1976-1979.
Thousands of new cases of human rights violations were brought before the
Argentine courts, most of them by human rights organisations and individuals
representing the victims and their families. Fearing prosecution of hundreds of its
middle-ranking officers, the military closed ranks and officers staged several
unsuccessful revolts against the Alfonsín’s government. Alfonsín responded quickly
by passing the so-called ‘full stop’ law (Ley de Punto Final) in 1986. The ‘full stop’
law in essence set a final date for which cases against military personnel for human
rights violations during the dictatorship had to be filed. This proved ineffective as a
number of judges worked around the clock to accept as many cases as possible within
the time limit. The military, feeling threatened by the prospect of mass-prosecutions,
staged the so-called Easter Uprising in 1987. In response, Alfonsín pushed the law of
‘due obedience’ (Ley de Obediencia Debida) through Congress, which severely
limited the scope of the prosecution against military personnel. According to the ‘due
obedience’ law, military personnel who acted on the orders of higher ranked officers
could not be held responsible for their actions. Because of these two laws, the courts
were forced to drop many of the cases brought before them.35 This is a clear example
of executive and congressional encroachment on the constitutional powers of the
judiciary. Alfonsín’s policy may be summed up as going from pro-human rights to
taking a much more reserved stance on the issue, due to perceived military threat. The
judiciary went from being more to less independent.
                                                  
34 Much of the information from this section is taken from Garro 1993 and Roniger and
Sznajder 1999.
35 See Kritz 1995, Vol. I.
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The first Menem government (1989-1994): Undoing the trials36
When Carlos Menem took over the presidency after Alfonsín in 1989, one of his first
moves was to issue sweeping presidential pardons. These set free the five imprisoned
generals as well pardoned 220 soldiers facing charges of human rights violations.37
Menem was clearly in favour of a forgive-and-forget policy rather than pressing for
justice. Again, the executive used his political powers to override the courts’ decisions
and interfere with court proceedings. To secure control over the Supreme Court,
Menem packed the Court in 1990 by increasing its number of justices from five to
nine. He also succeeded in getting two additional justices to resign, removed by
decree the Attorney General, and, finally, implemented a series of judicial reforms
expanding the number of vacancies particularly in the lower criminal courts.38 Not
surprisingly, therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Menem’s
pardon. Modifications of the justice system in this case can hardly be said to have
contributed to the independence of the judiciary. If anything, Menem increased
executive control of the courts, thus making them less independent.
In sum, the Argentine situation seven years after the transition to democracy
was an executive who openly supported a ‘forgive-and-forget’ policy, and who
wielded enough power over the courts to make the reversal in court proceedings
started by Alfonsín complete. Local human rights organisations, such as the Mothers
of the Plaza de Mayo, continued to put pressure on the government to acknowledge
the crimes committed by the state and disclose the facts of the disappeared. Their
claims were, for the time being, ignored, both by the government and the courts.
The second Menem government (1994-2000) and De la Rua (2000-): Trials
Years later, the human rights abuses of the past were again brought up in Argentina
and placed firmly on the political agenda in the form of two specific court cases: the
kidnapping of children of the disappeared and the quest for truth about the final
destiny of the disappeared. At the end of 1996, six women from the human rights
organisation Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo presented a case of the systematic
kidnapping of children of disappeared as a state-sponsored plan, involving 194
children.39 Notably, the disappearance of children given birth to by mothers while
detained in prison was the only crime not exempted by the punto final and the due
obedience laws passed by the Alfonsín government in 1986 and 1987 respectively.
However, since the generals had been tried for direct responsibility of the abduction
of a small number of children in the 1985 trials, they could technically not be tried
again.40
A combination of innovativeness on the part of the lawyers and the appellate
court judges who worked on the case, allowed them to charge the military with
                                                  
36 Information on the more recent trials is principally taken from various issues of the
Southern Cone Report (RS) from 1995-1999. Specific references are noted in the text.
37 RS-97-10, (16 December 1997: 8).
38 Helmke (1999: 24-25). Helmke also notes that following the initial court-packing and
resignations, three more justices have resigned and one has retired.
39 The Grandmothers claim that as many as 500 babies disappeared and have documented 230
cases. 60 young people were identified and located in 1998.
40 Note that in March 1998, the opposition in Congress repealed the ‘punto final’ and ‘due
obedience’ laws protecting the military from prosecution (RS-98-03, 21 April 1998: 6). A
public opinion poll taken in 1998 shows that this measure was supported by 80% of
Argentineans (RS-98-02, 10 March 1998: 2). However, this was mostly a symbolic gesture as
the measure was not retroactive. See CELS 1999 for a more detailed discussion.
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indirect responsibility for the same crime. Investigating judge Roberto Marquevich
ordered the detention of Videla (military president from 1976-79) on 9 June 1998 on
charges related to the alleged abduction of children during his military regime.41 State
prosecutor Rita Moreno, openly backed by president Menem, argued ‘double
jeopardy’, i.e. that the same person could not be tried for the same crime twice, and
that the Videla case should be turned over to the military authorities for resolution.
The prosecutors, nevertheless, successfully argued that the military had never been
formally charged with the crime of abduction and illegal adoption of children of
detainees as a systematic plan, and the proceedings continued.42
A few months after the detention of Videla, on 10 November 1998, another
federal judge, Adolfo Bagnasco, ordered Emilio Massera (junta member in 1976) to
give evidence about alleged kidnapping of 15 babies born by mothers held captive in
ESMA (the navy school).43 Two months later, on 22 January 1999, Bagnasco brought
formal charges against seven other former senior officers44 for the disappearance of
194 babies.45 Not happy with the development, the highest military council, the
Consufa (Consejo Superior de las Fuerzas Armadas) the following year tried to put
pressure on the judges to have the case transferred to military courts. However, the
Supreme Court ruled on 2 August that the case remained in civilian courts in the
hands of Bagnasco.46 As of mid-August 2000, this case was now about to enter the
oral hearing stage.
The second case of human rights abuses involving a large number of both
retired and currently active military personnel in Argentina is the demand for truth
about the destiny of the detained disappeared. The so-called juicio por la verdad was
presented in 1996 to the Federal Court of Buenos Aires by lawyer Alberto Pedronsini
on behalf of families of the disappeared. Other lawyers have followed suit, presenting
cases to other appellate courts in the country. Currently, the federal appellate courts of
Buenos Aires, La Plata, Bahía Blanca, and Córdoba have ruled that the families of the
disappeared and the society writ large have a right to know the facts about the final
destiny of the around 30,000 people who ‘disappeared’ during the dictatorship. The
Supreme Court in 1999 reluctantly upheld the decision of the right to truth in an
agreement signed with the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights.47
At the outset, these juicios por la verdad do not have criminal conviction as a
final aim, though many of the human rights organisations and their lawyers hope that
once the truth has been established, this will open up for prosecution of the military.
                                                  
41 See CELS (1998: 88-102).
42 RS-98-05, (30 June 1998: 3).
43 RS-98-09, (17 November 1998: 8); CELS (1998: 103).
44 These are: Admirals Emilio Massera, Rubén Franco and Antonio Vañek, Generals
Reynaldo Bignone and Cristino Nicolaides, and naval captains Jorge Acosta and Héctor
Febres. RS-99-01, (2 February 1999: 3).
45 RS-99-01, (2 February 1999: 3). Later the same year, on 2 September 1999, the Supreme
Court ruled that Admiral Emilio Massera should pay US $ 120,000 to a man whose siblings
and parents disappeared in July 1976. The courts also ordered that the state pay the same man
US $ 1 million in reparations RS-99-07, (7 September 1999: 8).
46 Clarín, Thursday 3 August 2000, p. 6.
47 See CELS 2000 for a discussion of the so-called Lapacó case. The Supreme Court in 1998
ruled that the claims of Lapacó were inadmissible. After an appeal to the Interamerican
Comission for Human Rights, the Argentine Government accepted and guaranteed the right to
truth and granted the federal Appellate Courts the right to investigate the cases of the final
destiny of the disappeared.
14
Though the appellate courts have demanded that the military give information about
the final destinies of the disappeared, so far, very few military officers have agreed to
co-operate. As a result, the federal courts have been detaining officers for shorter time
periods for the failure to comply with court orders, causing much stir within military
ranks. The military tried to put pressure to have the Cámara de Casación (a judidical
organ at the level of federal Appellate Courts charged with dealing with special cases)
intervene, but were not successful.48
In sum, a large number of Argentinean generals are now facing the prospect of
trials. The question then is, why have Argentinean judges decided to take on these
cases and push for prosecution? The trigger for initiating new prosecutions against
military personnel was the voluntary, repentant confession in 1995 by retired navy
officer Adolfo Scilingo that he had participated in the ‘disappearance’ of a number of
people between 1976 and 1978. This was a first-ever confession in Argentina.49
Shortly after, the chief of staff of the Argentine army, Lieutenant-General Martín
Balza, gave a public statement where he acknowledged and apologised for the army’s
involvement in killings and disappearances.50 A year later, navy officer Alfredo Astiz
proudly acknowledged involvement in the same crimes, defending the military’s
conduct. By 1998, eight military members had given accounts of their involvement in
killings and disappearances.51
These confessions had two main effects. First, they signalled an increasingly
visible internal split within the military apparatus over guilt connected with these
crimes - a weakness that the courts picked up on. Second, Scilingo’s confession
galvanised the human rights community into renewed action. Though human rights
organisations had been presenting cases to the courts since the beginning of the
dictatorship in 1976, there had been a period of low activity following Menem’s
sweeping pardons of the generals in 1990. Scilingo’s confessions preceded another
important event: the 20th anniversary of the coup. Human rights NGOs organised
widespread rallies, conferences, and other activities, drawing a lot of public
attention.52 Parallel to a gradual change in civil-military relations and an increased
pressure from the human rights sector, there have also been institutional changes. The
constitutional reforms passed by the Argentine Congress in 199453 involved three
changes that were directly relevant to the judicial apparatus: (1) the creation of a
National Judicial Council (Consejo de la Magistratura); (2) the declaration of the
Public Ministry as an independent organ; and (3) the installation of a Jurado de
Enjuciamiento, which is in charge of removing national judges, except for Supreme
Court judges at the federal level.54 Though these reforms formally increased the
independence of the judiciary, it is, perhaps, too soon to evaluate to what extent these
                                                  
48 La Nación, Wednesday 19 July, 2000, p. 5.
49 RS-95-03, (20 April 1995: 3); CELS (1995: 123-145). The importance of Scilingo’s
confession was repeatedly brought to my attention in a series of interviews carried out in
Argentina in July-August 2000.
50 RS-95-04, (1 June 1995: 6).
51 RS-98-01, (3 February 1998: 2-3).
52 See CELS 1996 for details.
53 Scholars have suggested that Menem traded these reforms with the opposition in return for
congressional backing for constitutional reforms that allowed him to run for a second term,
the so-called Olivos Pact (Finkel 1999). This view is also supported by a number of legal
experts I interviewed in Buenos Aires in July 2000.
54 See CELS (1995: 79) for details.
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formal changes have affected the actual independence of judges.55 What I would
argue, however, is that a fourth constitutional change has had a direct and profound
impact on the behaviour of justices with respect to human rights cases: the
incorporation of international human rights treaties as part of the Constitution, which
has given international human rights law preference over national law.56 Though most
international conventions were adopted and signed at the beginning of Alfonsín’s
government shortly after the transition, judges had paid little heed to international
human rights law. Once part of the Constitution, however, it has become increasingly
difficult for judges to ignore the UN and Interamerican conventions of human rights
as doing so would not only mean breaking the law but also violating the
Constitution.57 More specifically, the incorporation of international human rights law
has allowed judges to classify the systematic kidnapping of as genocide, thus
invoking the UN Convention against Genocide and Crimes against Humanity. Finally,
it has obliged the Supreme Court to uphold the various Appellate Court rulings of the
right to truth in accordance with the Interamerican Convention of Human Rights.
Argentine judges may also have been sensitised to the application of
international human rights law by the new trend of judges in Germany, France, Italy
and Spain to prosecute Latin American personnel, including several Argentinean
retired generals, for crimes committed against their nationals on Latin American soil
during the dictatorship. The arrest of Pinochet in London in 1998 and his later return
to Chile where he is now facing the prospect of prosecution, have no doubt served as
an eye opener for many Argentine judges.
The increased sensitivity of judges to international law combined with a
reduction in military threat and renewed human rights activism together offer a
plausible explanation for why the Argentine courts have gradually taken on a more
active role in human rights issues after 1996, despite President Menem’s protests. It is
therefore clear that executive dominance cannot account for the recent policy
outcomes on human rights issues in Argentina. As I will show in the next section,
Chile had a very different starting point, but has ended up with strikingly similar
policy results.
B. Chile – from amnesty to trials
The Aylwin government (1990-1994): Transition and amnesty
Unlike Argentina’s transition by collapse in 1984, Chile’s move to democratic rule in
1990, after 17 years of military dictatorship, was one of careful elite negotiations and
bargaining. Though Pinochet unexpectedly lost elections he himself staged, the
military was still strong and succeeded largely in dictating matters on human rights
issues: no prosecution would occur. Immunity was furthered guaranteed by the
amnesty law passed by Pinochet by decree in 1978. The law barred prosecution for all
human rights violations committed in the period 1973-78 – at the peak of repression.
President Aylwin did, however, succeed in setting up a truth commission, Comisión
Rettig, though it had no investigatory powers. Wise from the Argentinean experience,
Aylwin made no attempt at pressing for prosecutions.
                                                  
55 For example, the Judicial Council only became operative in 1998 and had in August 2000
only nominated one new judge to the more than 70 vacancies. Interviews with Council
members as well as other judges and lawyers suggest that the workings of the Council have
been far from satisfactory.
56 See Sabsay and Onaindia 1998.
57 This point was supported by a large number of lawyers, judges and law clerks I interviewed
in Buenos Aires in July-August, 2000.
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The institutional legacies of the Pinochet regime are well known. In brief, the
1980 Constitution, imposed by Pinochet, guaranteed the military continued power or
influence over such government institutions as the senate (nine designated senators),
the Supreme Court (which Pinochet packed just before leaving office by encouraging
voluntary retirement and increasing the number of justices), the national Security
Council, and the constitutional tribunal. Because the military was still strong,
Pinochet continued as head of the armed forces, and the Supreme Court was largely
Pinochet appointed, we get the expected outcome in human rights policies at the time
of transition: no trials. If transition theory were correct, this would have been the end
of the matter. It was not.
The Frei government (1994-1998): Two trials
President Frei never took an official stance for or against the human rights issue.
Nevertheless, the first two trials finished on 30 May 1995, when the Supreme Court’s
final ruling condemned two ex-generals, Manuel Contreras and Pedro Espinoza, to
prison for the murder of Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier and his secretary
Roni Moffit in Washington in 1976.58 This signalled important changes in civil-
military relations. First, that the still Pinochet-friendly court was willing to push
through such a case demonstrated a new sensitivity to human rights issues.59 Second,
the fact that the military, though it grumbled, did not take up arms over the issue in
support of the two ex-generals suggested that the military was less willing than earlier
to threaten democratic procedures and the rule of law.60 The trials of Espinoza and
Contreras have often been quoted in Chilean and international media as ‘a test case of
judicial independence’ and ‘a triumph for the rule of law’.61 Yet, reactions to this case
were strong and underlined deep divisions in Chilean society. A public opinion poll
held on 20 July 1995 showed that 65.8% of Chileans were in agreement with the
outcome of the trials.62 By contrast, in support of the military, five right-wing senators
presented a bill to Congress on 18 July calling for the 1978 amnesty law to close all
cases pending against members of the armed forces. However, Congress never
adopted this Argentine-style ‘punto final’ law. Consequently, the 600 or so cases
pending in Chilean courts against military personnel remained in progress.
It is pertinent to mention that the courts – and especially the Supreme Court -
had been extremely pro-military during Pinochet’s rule and had previously rejected
thousands of cases of alleged human rights violations brought before them by non-
governmental organisations and private individuals. Several reform proposals had
been introduced to Congress during the Aylwin government. However, Congress
never approved the reforms. There have been two major points of resistance to
judicial reform. First, the right-wingers (notably the designated senators) succeeded in
                                                  
58 The Letelier and Moffit case was the only case exempted from the amnesty law of 1978 for
crimes committed outside Chile.
59 Note, however, that the Supreme Court was still not committed to human rights trials. The
internal split in the court over proceedings in human rights matters became obvious in a 1996
trial case where the Supreme Court granted amnesty to the military personnel charged with
the killing of Spanish UN official Carmelo Soria in 1976 (RS-96-07, 12 September 1996: 8).
60 This contrasts with military reaction provoked by a judge raising charges against Pinochet’s
son for corruption two years earlier. The military then took to the streets with tanks and armed
personnel. The so-called Tablada reminded politicians that the military was still a force to be
reckoned with.
61 RS-95-05, (6 July 1995: 1). See also Hunter 1998.
62 RS-95-06, (10 August 1995:1).
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voting down judicial reform legislation introduced to the Senate in 1991. Second, at
least eight of the 17 members of the Supreme Court were in 1997 known to be
opposed to any reform that might simplify court proceedings, and even more opposed
to changes in the rules for selecting judges.63 In spite of this resistance, President Frei
again proposed reforms to Congress in mid-July of 1997, including changes to the
composition of, and rules for making appointments to, the Supreme Court, increasing
the number of members, and setting a compulsory retirement age of 75.64 Congress
finally adopted the so-called ‘Supreme Court Reform Bill’ in 1997.65
The Lagos government (1998-): Numerous trials
Augusto Pinochet’s arrest in London in October 1998 greatly troubled the new Lagos
government and caught the attention of the world media. Pinochet’s subsequent return
to Chile in 1999 after heavy pressure from the Chilean government and the
unexpected 16-4 vote of the Chilean Supreme Court on 8 August, 2000 in favour of
upholding the Appellate Court’s decision to strip Pinochet of his senatorial immunity
have also made headline news.66 The basis for the Appellate Court’s decision was
Pinochet’s proved involvement in the so-called Death Caravan (Caravana de la
muerte) where 19 people disappeared in October 1973. That Pinochet may now face
trials for systematic human rights violations is a situation very few scholars - or
Chilean citizens - imagined only weeks before the Appellate Court made its ruling
known.67 The ex-dictator is currently facing 175 charges, presented by non-
governmental human rights organisations, the Communist Party, and private
individuals.68 Moreover, more than seventy other retired military officers, including
three generals, have lately been detained and charged with offences including murder,
kidnapping, and torture.
Although the arrest of Pinochet and his subsequent loss of senatorial immunity
undoubtedly have catalysed charges against other military officers, it is important to
note that the process of trials were well underway before his arrest. Lawyer Eduardo
Contreras presented the first case against Pinochet in January 1998 on behalf of the
leader of the Communist Party, Gladys Marin, whose husband is one of the
disappeared in the Death Caravan. Three more cases were already under review in the
Appellate Court when Pinochet was detained in London. Thus, I would argue, his
arrest encouraged rather than caused the increase in activity of human rights activists,
who had been steadily been presenting cases to the courts for the last twenty-five
years – mostly in vain.
Second, I would argue that the military’s reaction – or absence thereof – to
Pinochet’s arrest and subsequent events, is essential to understanding the charges
                                                  
63 RS-97-05, (24 June 1997:7).
64 RS-97-06, (29 July 1996:2).
65 See Bickford 1998.
66 Interestingly, some of the judges who voted in favour of stripping Pinochet of his immunity
are Pinochet appointees.
67 Very few of the about 40 people I interviewed in the period May-July, 2000, in Chile
thought that the Appellate Court would strip Pinochet of his immunity. Even fewer thought
that the Supreme Court would uphold such a decision. Virtually nobody thought that trials
would be even a remote possibility.
68 Figure from 15 November, 2000. The day the Supreme Court announced its verdict in the
immunity case, Pinochet was facing 157 charges. Consult the web page of Chilean human
rights organisation, FASIC, for a complete list over cases raised against Pinochet and other
military personnel: www.fasic.org.
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raised against military personnel. The ‘grandfather’ (tata) of the country has lost his
long-standing reputation as untouchable, naturally causing concern among the
military. However, they have not taken to the streets in his defence, suggesting that
the former-commander-in-chief and former head-of-state no longer plays a political
role in Chilean politics. When Pinochet’s son faced charges of corruption in 1993, the
military reacted with tanks in the streets (the charges were subsequently dropped).
When the Appellate Court was about to launch its decision on Pinochet’s immunity in
June 2000, the generals of the four military branches reacted by organising a ‘secret’
– but conveniently leaked to the press - lunch. We may thus conclude that the military
is no longer willing to protect their ageing former chief at whatever price.69 The
military’s passive acceptance of Pinochet’s arrest and the recent charges raised
against both Pinochet and a number of other generals suggests that they have accepted
civilian dominance in political matters and are willing to face the past. The
appointment of General Ricardo Izurieta as army commander on 31 October 1997,
and his taking over the post after Pinochet stepped down in 1998, signalled a new
course in military politics. Izurieta is reportedly regarded as ‘free of the burdens of
past crimes associated with the Pinochet generation’.70
Another notable change in military behaviour has been their willingness to
participate in roundtable talks on the issue of detained disappeared. After Pinochet’s
arrest, a commission, the so-called Mesa de Diálogo, was established on the initiative
of the Chilean Minister of Defense. The commission was composed of members from
all four military branches, lawyers, human rights activists, politicians and various
prestigious cultural celebrities. The commission concluded its work in June 2000,
where the military agreed to provide information about the destiny of the detained
disappeared. This is the first time in Chilean post-transitional history that the military
officially has acknowledged participation in systematic human rights abuses and have
publicly obliged themselves to help establish the truth about the destiny of the
disappeared.71
In addition to a noticeably weakened military and an invigorated human rights
sector, a couple of changes within the judiciary itself in recent years are crucial to
explaining the desafuero of Pinochet and most of the recent arrests. A selection of
judges have reinterpreted detained disappeared as a permanent delete (secuestro
permanente), hence barring this particular type of crime from protection by the 1978
Amnesty Law. As long as the body has not been found, the case remains open.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Guzmán launched the interpretation of detained
disappeared as a permanent delete when he took on the first case against Pinochet in
January 1998.72 Gradually, judges have arrived upon a consensus regarding this term.
The Supreme Court has upheld the Appellate Court’s interpretation. Important
changes to the Court have arguably allowed this to happen. As mentioned, the
                                                  
69 RS-97-09, (11 November 1997:2).
70 Note that part of this may have to do with the fact that there has been a generational shift
within the military. The officers who are currently being charged with crimes of human rights
violations are retired or senior officers who no longer play a central role in the military
apparatus.
71 However, there is strong scepticism among some of the human rights organisations and
human rights lawyers in Chile that the military will actually keep their promise and come up
with new information about the disappeared. Information gathered through a large number of
interviews carried out in Santiago in May-June 2000.
72 Information conveyed in interviews with various Appellate Court and Supreme Court
judges in July 2000.
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Supreme Court Bill of 1997 increased the number of Supreme Court justices from 17
to 21 and introduced a forced retirement age of 75.73 This brought new and younger
judges on board, including five judges recruited outside the system, who are more
sensitive to international human rights law. Changes in the composition of the
Supreme Court have had important signal effects for the Appellate Court judges.
Because of the hierarchical structure of the Chilean justice system and the career path
culminating in the Supreme Court, Appellate Court judges known to look to the
highest court.74 Like their Argentinean counterparts, Chilean judges have also been
influenced by the activity of European judges’ use of international human rights law
to prosecute Chilean and other Latin American nationals abroad. This has raised the
issue of national sovereignty and questioned the competence of Latin American
judges to prosecute their own criminals.75
In sum, I would argue that three parallel trends have contributed to the Chilean
courts’ increased activism in human rights issues: (1) changes in the composition of
the Supreme Court after the reform passed in 1997; (2) the large number of cases and
documentation brought to the courts by human rights organisations and their lawyers,
and (3) a visible reduction in what I have called ‘military threat’, which has allowed
the courts to operate more independently.
Conclusions
In this paper I have argued that variation in judicial independence is crucial to
understanding variation in human rights policies over time, here narrowly interpreted
as the presence or absence of trials of (ex) military personnel for gross human rights
violations they committed during military rule. I have challenged Pion-Berlin and
Arceneaux’s argument that policy outcomes are inextricably tied to levels of
institutional concentration and autonomy in the executive branch. Human rights gains,
they argue, occur when policy-making authority is centred in a few hands and where
the president can use institutional channels suitably closed to military influence.
My empirical analysis of Chile and Argentina has suggested that an
independent judiciary free to enforce the rule of law without deferring to executive
preference or military threats/pressures may be significantly influential in determining
policy outcomes. The Argentine judiciary demonstrated a rather high degree of
independence at the time of transition. Its independence was severely curbed, first by
Alfonsín in 1986 and 1987, and then further by Menem in 1990. After judicial
reforms in 1994 and 1996, the judiciary seems to have regained some of its
independence. This is seen in increased judicial activism in human rights cases
involving the military. The Chilean judiciary, by contrast, has gone through a much
more steady development. From having hardly any autonomy and authority due to
military direct and indirect influence at the transition in 1990, judges progressed to
showing somewhat more independence in 1996. The judicial reforms passed in 1998
and, combined with a further reduction in military threat, and a boost of activity in the
                                                  
73 The reform also incorporated two-thirds senatorial approval in the nomination process of
Supreme Court judges. See Bickford 1998: 17, footnote 17 for detail on the reforms.
74 This differs from Argentina, where the Federal Appellate Courts are considered the highest
judicial position a judge may hope for. Getting a post in the Argentine Supreme Court has
been paralleled to winning the jack pot. Information from interviews with judges and court
clerks in Buenos Aires, July-August, 2000.
75 This was one of the central arguments in the Chilean government’s campaign to have
Pinochet returned to Chile rather than be extradited to Spain.
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human rights sector have enabled the courts to act more independently since 1998
than any scholar would have predicted ten years earlier.
If my argument holds true more generally, we would expect in the future to
see more trials of (ex) military officers for gross human rights violations in other
Latin American countries that have carried out judicial reform during the last decade.
This includes countries with high levels of human rights violations, such as
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Paraguay. Executives in these countries have carried out
substantial constitutional reforms expanding the autonomy of the courts from the
executive. But as long as the military remains a strong force in politics, the exercise of
judicial authority and autonomy may continue to be limited.
Another case where we might expect trials of military officers in the future is
Uruguay, where the ‘disappeared’ are still an issue.76 This small Southern Cone
country, which became infamous for having the largest portion of its citizens
imprisoned and tortured during the military dictatorship in the 1970s, has so far done
nothing to prosecute its military. The combination of an executive, ex-President
Sanguinetti, who was openly in favour of forgetting the matters of the past and a
judiciary dependent on the executive may account for this inaction. The military has
posed no apparent threat to civilian rule since return to democracy in 1984, and there
has been a persistent demand for justice from the human rights sector, notably for
recovery of disappeared children and grandchildren. Therefore, if constitutional
judicial reforms were to be pushed through, we would expect trials.
The argument may, of course, also be extended beyond Latin America.
Numerous African countries, for instance, have undergone both transitions to
democracy and are currently revamping their judicial systems. As these new
democracies become more solidified, we would expect courts to take on cases of
human rights violations carried out by previous regimes. The theoretical implication
of my argument is that with the events of judicial reform and a gradual retreat by the
military from the political sphere, we may have to rethink the meaning of civil-
military relations to systematically include a neglected third player – the judiciary -
when analysing post-transitional politics. The entry of a more independent judiciary
on the political scene obviously influences the balance of power within government
institutions, which, in turn, may have a direct impact on policy outcomes, such as on
human rights.
                                                  
76 The issue of the ‘disappeared’ during the military regimes of the 1970s and 1980s was
suddenly resurrected in 1997, 12 years after the return of civilian rule, and nine years after the
adoption of a plebiscite that precluded further investigations into alleged human rights abuses.
A civilian judge, Alberto Reyes, ruled on 14 April 1997 that efforts should be make to locate
burial places reported to be concealed in two military installations. This provoked an outrage
among the military and euphoria among human rights activists and relatives of the 32
disappeared. Then president Sanguinetti reluctantly gave permission for civilian magistrates
to pursue their inquiries inside the military installations (RS-97-04, 20 May 1997: 7).
However, an appeals court overruled the decision of judge Reyes only two months later,
hence upholding the prerogatives of the amnesty law (RS-97-05, 24 June 1997: 3). The new
president, Jorge Batlle, seems to have a different position on the human rights issue than did
his predecessor.
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Appendix 1
Constitutional reforms affecting judicial independence
Country Transition Number of Years
after
Transition
Constitutional
Reforms affecting
Judicial independence
Rating of
Constitutional
Reforms77
Argentina 1983 17 1994, 1996 3
Belize 1981 19 1988 0.5
Bolivia 1982 18 1994 3
Brazil 1985 15 1998 1
Chile 1990 10 1997, 1999 3
Colombia 1958 42 1991, 1997 4
Costa Rica None 1989 2
Dominican Rep. 1966 34 1995 2
Ecuador 1978 22 1986, 1993, 1996, 1997 2
El Salvador 1992  8 1994, 1996 3
Guatemala 1996  4 1993 3
Honduras 1981 19 None 0
Mexico None 1994 4
Nicaragua 1979 21 1995 1.5
Panama 1993  7 None 0
Paraguay 1993  7 1992 3
Peru 1980 20 1993 4
Uruguay 1984 16 None 0
Venezuela None None 0
Sources: English translation of most recent constitution for each country used to determine
constitutional changes along variables 1-4 specified in section III C (see footnote below).
Supplemented by information from Freedom House Survey 1998, and numerous secondary sources for
individual countries to assess overall evaluation/extent of reform. See for example Bickford 1998,
Dakolias 1996, García 1995, Hammergren 1998, Helmke 1999, and Sutil 1999.
                                                  
77 As explained in III C, I have singled out four variables as key indicators of structural independence:
(i) appointment procedures of Supreme Court judges; (ii) length of tenure for Supreme Court judges;
(iii) the establishment of judicial councils, and (iv) measures to increase the judicial review powers of
the supreme court, through the creation of constitutional courts or by other means. Any change noted in
the Constitution for each of these variables has been awarded one point, hence rating of reforms on a
scale from 1 to 4.
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This paper is about how varying degrees of judicial
independence may influence policy making in the
field of human rights. I explore factors that may ac-
count for why some Latin American courts, years after
the return to democratic rule, are currently prosecut-
ing (ex) military officers for crimes they committed
under authoritarianism, while other courts have cho-
sen to ignore this politically explosive issue. I argue
that certain constitutional changes undertaken in re-
cent years coupled with a reduction in military threat
have increased the propensity of judges to reinterpret
existing amnesty laws and take on human rights cases
they would have rejected earlier. At least one more
factor is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition
for trials to take place: a persistent demand for jus-
tice. To test my argument, I carry out an in-depth qual-
itative study of two ‘success stories’, Argentina and
Chile. Because many newly established democracies
in various regions of the world are in the process of
strengthening their institutions and democratic prac-
tices, as well as trying to deal with the legacies of
their authoritarian pasts, the lessons drawn from the
Southern Cone should be of more general interest to
scholars of both political science and law.
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